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ARBITRATION OF OLYMPIC ELIGIBILITY
DISPUTES: FAIR PLAY AND THE
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
JAY E. G1F,.iG*
A. INTRODUCTION
A competition between two Greco-Roman wrestlers went from the
wrestling mat to the federal courts the summer prior to the 2000
Olympic games. Keith Sieracki was declared the winner of the Olympic
trials competition conducted by United States of America Wrestling As-
sociation (USA Wrestling), the national governing body for Greco-Ro-
man wrestling. Matthew Lindland, the defeated wrestler, protested the
result after the match. Lindland ultimately submitted the dispute to ar-
bitration as provided by Article IX of the constitution of the United
States Olympic Committee (USOC). As is customary in Article IX arbi-
trations, Sieracki, as the prevailing athlete in the competition, was not
made a party to the arbitration between Lindland and USA Wrestling.'
After a hearing of which Sieracki was not notified and in which he
did not participate, the arbitrator made an award on August 9, 2000,
setting aside the result of the competition and ordering another match
between Lindland and Sieracki.2 Sieracki participated in the re-wrestle
under protest and after filing his own request for arbitration.
Lindland won the re-wrestle by a unanimous decision. However,
"USA Wrestling did not replace Sieracki with Lindland as its nominee
for the Olympic team; instead, [USA Wrestling] ... put Lindland on an
eligibility list, from which he might replace Sieracki in the event of in-
jury."'3 Lindland then filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois to enforce the August 9, 2000 arbitration
award by Arbitrator Burns.
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Willamette University; J.D.,
University of California Hastings College of the Law.
1. Sieracki v. USA Wrestling, AAA No. 30 190 00483 00 (Aug. 24,2000) (A.B. Campbell,
Arb.). See also Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Ass'n, 227 F.3d 1000, 1005
(7th Cir. 2000).
2. Lindland v. USA Wrestling, AAA No. 30 190 00443 00 (Aug. 9,2000) (D. Bums, Arb.)
(hereinafter Lindland 1).
3. Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Ass'n, 230 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir.
2000) (hereinafter Lindland II).
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In the arbitration proceeding initiated by Sieracki, Sieracki sought a
determination that he should be the sole nominee at his weight class to
the Greco-Roman Olympic team to the exclusion of Lindland. In a
counterclaim to the Sieracki arbitration, Lindland sought a determina-
tion that Sieracki's nomination by USA Wrestling to the USOC should
be withdrawn and that Lindland should be the sole nominee at the 76-
kilogram weight class for the Greco-Roman Olympic team. On August
24, 2000, the arbitrator in the Sieracki arbitration directed USA Wres-
tling to withdraw the nomination of Lindland and to designate Sieracki
as the sole nominee to the team roster at the 76-kilogram weight class.4
Lindland petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois for enforcement of the Burns Award. The district court dis-
missed Lindland's action to enforce the August 9, 2000 arbitration award
without a written opinion.5 Lindland then appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Both USA Wrestling and the USOC
responded that the arbitration award was "problematic because Sieracki
was not a party to the arbitration. "6
In an August 24, 2000, opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook, the
court held that the Federal Arbitration Act 7 "does not provide that the
absence of an interested person privileges a person who did participate
[in the arbitration proceeding] to disregard an adverse decision."8 The
court also noted that section 220529 of the Ted Stevens Olympic and
Amateur Sports Act 9 (Stevens Act) calls for arbitration between the ag-
grieved athlete and the governing body and does not require arbitration
among athletes.10
The Seventh Circuit observed that Sieracki had "initiated his own
arbitration protesting the result of the rematch (and perhaps protesting
USA Wrestling's willingness to implement at least... part of the Bums
Award)" treating the winner of the re-wrestle as "the winner" for
Olympic purposes." While conceding that the Sieracki arbitration in-
cluded "both wrestlers, plus the USOC, and thus is more comprehensive
than the proceeding conducted before Arbitrator Burns,"12 the court
4. Sieracki, AAA No. 30 190 00483 00, slip op. at 4.
5. Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1038.
6. Id. at 1039.
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (1994).
8. Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1039 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10).
9. 36 U.S.C. § 220501-220529 (1994 & Supp. IV 2000).
10. § 220529.
11. Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1039.
12. Id.
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correctly predicted that this proceeding created "a possibility that USA
Wrestling [would] be subject to inconsistent awards.' 13
Pointing out that "[a]rbitrators need not follow judicial notions of
issue and claim preclusion,.. .which increases the chance of inconsistent
awards,"' 4 the court warned that these "are risks that USA Wrestling
took when it decided not to bring Sieracki into the original proceeding,
and this risk does not justify USA Wrestling's incomplete implementa-
tion of the Burns Award."'" According to the Seventh Circuit, "[a] party
to arbitration cannot refuse to implement an existing award just because
it dreads the prospect of a later incompatible award; indeed, even when
incompatible awards are rendered the party may be required to imple-
ment both."16
The court was critical of the suggestion of the USOC that Lindland
had demonstrated his unfitness for the team by initiating litigation rather
than be accepting the results of USA Wrestling's internal processes. 7
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Burns Award required "USA
Wrestling to send Lindland's name to the USOC as its champion and
nominee."' 8
At about the same time as the Seventh Circuit was issuing its deci-
sion, Arbitrator Campbell issued his decision in the Sieracki arbitration
"order[ing] USA Wrestling to ignore the result of the rematch and trans-
mit Sieracki's name to the [USOC] as its sole nominee."' 9 "USA Wres-
tling [first] attempted to comply with both decisions. It sent the USOC a
notice... informing it of [the Seventh Circuit's] decision, but not 'nomi-
nating' Lindland."2 At the same time, "it sent the USOC a notice with-
drawing any nomination of Lindland and nominating Sieracki as the
[team member]."''2
In no uncertain terms the Seventh Circuit ordered USA Wrestling
"to implement the Burns Award by making Lindland its nominee. '21 An
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1039 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union
of the Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
213 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2000)).
17. Id. at 1040.
18. Id.
19. Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Ass'n, 228 F.3d 782, 783 (7t" Cir.
2000).
20. Id
21. Id
22. Id.
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obviously perturbed court pointed out that Arbitrator Campbell's in-
struction to disregard the Burns Award had not been subjected to judi-
cial review or enforcement whereas "the Judicial Branch of the United
States of America has instructed [USA Wrestling] to implement the
Burns award by making Lindland its nominee. '23 The court warned that
"[c]hoosing which instructions to follow should not be difficult - but if
USA Wrestling continues, equivocating the district court should be able
to make the wiser course clear." 24
On August 26, 2000, USA Wrestling sent Lindland's name to the
USOC. However, the USOC "refused to accept Lindland as a member
of the team, asserting that USA Wrestling's nomination of Lindland was
untimely because Sieracki's name already had been sent to the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (JOC)." 25
In a third proceeding in federal court, Sieracki sought confirmation
of the Campbell Award and Lindland sought to compel the USOC to
send his name to the IOC.26 The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois "ordered the USOC to request the IOC to substitute
Lindland for Sieracki ' '27 and "denied Sieracki's petition to confirm the
Campbell Award. ' 28  The USOC did so and the IOC made the
substitution.29
The district court "also denied Sieracki's petition to confirm the
Campbell Award."30 The district court read Consolidation Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers3 as precluding enforcement of incompatible
awards.32 Because only one of the two athletes can be on the Olympic
team, "the district judge thought that federal courts should not order the
USOC to send both. 33
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held, in a decision dated September 1,
2000, that the Campbell Award in the Sieracki arbitration could not be
confirmed.34 The Seventh Circuit expressed concern that not only did
the Campbell Award approve the result of the original match won by
23. Id.
24. Lindland, 228 F.3d at 783.
25. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1002.
30. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002.
31. 213 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2000).
32. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1003.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1004.
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Sieracki and the adequacy of USA Wrestling's grievance procedures, but
that the Campbell Award directed USA Wrestling not to implement the
Bums Award. 5
Observing that "[d]efinitive resolution of the right way to handle
conflicting awards, after one has been confirmed, may await another
day,"336 the Seventh Circuit stated that the Campbell Award could not be
confirmed for two reasons. First, the court held that the "entire proceed-
ing appears to have been ultra vires.'" Second, the court held that "the
award violate[d] the Commercial Rules of the [AAA]. 38
With respect to the first reason, the Seventh Circuit ruled that "[t]he
Stevens Act does not authorize arbitration about the propriety of an-
other arbitrator's decision."3 9 Recognizing that Sieracki did not have an
arbitrable claim under the Stevens Act because he was not a "party ag-
grieved by a determination" of USA Wrestling, the Seventh Circuit de-
clared that "[t]he Stevens Act would be self-destructive if it authorized
such proceedings, which would lead to enduring turmoil... and defeat
[the Act's] function of facilitating final resolution of disputes."4
Turning to the second reason, the Seventh Circuit noted that Rule 48
of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules provides that an "arbitra-
tor is not empowered to redetermine the merits of any claim already
decided."'" Whatever powers Arbitrator Campbell possessed with re-
spect to Sieracki, the Seventh Circuit declared that "he lacked the power
to order USA Wrestling to nominate anyone other than the winner of
the rematch."4 2
The Seventh Circuit recognized that Sieracki was not a party to Lind-
land I but noted that the Stevens Act provides only "for [an] arbitration
between an aggrieved athlete and the national governing body, not for
arbitration among athletes. '43 It suggested that USA Wrestling, "by de-
fending its decision... , also defend[ed] the interests of the winning
athlete."'  Although "the constitution or bylaws of the USOC or USA
35. Id. at 1003.
36. Id.
37. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1003.
38. Id. "AAA" is the acronym for the American Arbitration Association and is used
throughout the remainder of this article.
39. Id. (citing 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a)).
40. Id at 1004.
41. Id.
42. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1003.
43. Id. at 1005.
44. Id.
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Wrestling could designate as additional parties those athletes potentially
affected by the proceedings," the court stressed that they did not do so.45
At the Olympics in Sydney, Australia, Lindland was ultimately de-
feated by a Russian wrestler and awarded the silver medal. No further
litigation ensued.
B. APPLICABLE LAWS AND RULES
The Stevens Act sets forth a comprehensive scheme for amateur ath-
letic activity in the United States, including participation in the Olym-
pics. Subchapter 146 of the Stevens Act describes the powers and duties
of the USOC. Subchapter III' of the Stevens Act recognizes amateur
sports organizations as "National Governing Bodies."48 The Stevens
Act requires the USOC to
establish and maintain provisions in its constitution and bylaws
for the swift and equitable resolution of disputes involving any of
its members and relating to the opportunity of an amateur ath-
lete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to partici-
pate in the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, the Pan-
American Games, world championship competition, or other pro-
tected competition as defined in the constitution and bylaws.4 9
The constitution of the USOC provides a complaint procedure culmi-
nating in arbitration for disputes involving amateur athletes allegations
that a USOC member has denied the athlete the right to participate in
the Olympic Games, the Pan American Games, the Paralympic Games,
a World Championship competition, or any other such protected compe-
tition. 0 The USOC's constitution provides that the athlete may submit a
claim against the USOC member to any regional office of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) not later than six months after the date
of the denial.51
The athlete must include with the initial submission to the AAA a list
of all persons the athlete believes may be adversely affected by the arbi-
tration.52 The USOC member against which the arbitration has been
45. Id.
46. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220512.
47. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220521-220529.
48. § 220521. The USOC may recognize only one national governing body for each sport.
49. § 220509(a).
50. UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMM., CONSTITUTION art. IX, § 2 (1998) [hereinafter
USOC CONSTITUTION].
51. Id.
52. Id. § 3.
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filed must then promptly submit to the AAA a list of persons the mem-
ber believes may be adversely affected by the arbitration.53 The arbitra-
tor must then promptly determine which additional persons must receive
notice of the arbitration.54 The athlete then provides appropriate notice
to these persons.55 The USOC constitution further provides that "[a]ny
person so notified then shall have the option to participate in the arbitra-
tion as a party, however all persons so notified shall be bound by the
results of the arbitration regardless of their decision to participate. '56
C. DISCUSSION
Fundamental fairness guarantees that no one may have his or her
rights extinguished by an adjudicatory process unless that person has
first received a full and fair opportunity for a hearing. In other words,
strangers to a prior case cannot be bound by it.5" Although the Seventh
Circuit recognized that Sieracki was not a party to the Lindland arbitra-
tion, it ruled that this was not a defense to the obligation of USA Wres-
tling to comply with the Burns Award in Lindland L 9
Where there is more than one arbitration proceeding involving the
same issues but different parties, there is a risk of final and binding in-
consistent decisions. While recognizing this problem,60 the Seventh Cir-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Id.
57. Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEx. L. REv. 63,
64 (1988); James R. Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral Es-
toppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U. L. Rav. 383 (1983); see also Local Lodge
1617, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Associated Trans., Inc., 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2342, 2344
(D.N.C. 1976) (same violation involving different employees does not provide basis for appli-
cation of res judicata); Hotel Ass'n of Washington, D.C. v. Hotel & Rest. Employees Union,
Local 25, 963 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (arbitrator did not ignore contract language providing
that grievance resolutions would be "final and binding" when he declined to follow an earlier
arbitration decision concerning the same contract language, but involving a different griev-
ant); REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JuDGMENTs § 34(3) (1982). Cf Jay Grenig, Contract Inter-
pretation and Respect for Prior Proceedings, in 1 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBrrRATION
§ 9.06[1][c] (Bornstein et al. eds. 2d ed. 2001).
58. Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157,
159 (1967) (arbitration award may be unenforceable if an indispensable party is missing from
litigation); Office & Prof'l Employees Int'l Union v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 210 F.3d 117, 122
(2d Cir. 2000) (absence of third party affected by decision "rendered continued enforcement
of the judgment entered on that award ... inequitable"). See also Ratliff, supra note 57, at 64
n.8.
59. Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1039.
60. Id. (The court commented that "[d]efinitive resolution of the right way to handle con-
flicting awards after one has been confirmed may await another day.").
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cuit said this was a "risk ... that USA Wrestling took when it decided
not to bring Sieracki into the original [arbitration] proceeding."'6 1 Of
course, it was Sieracki, not USA Wrestling, who was denied the opportu-
nity to participate in the original arbitration proceeding.
The potential for conflicting arbitration awards is not new to the
courts. In a number of cases, the courts have refused to order a three-
party, or tripartite, arbitration involving all three parties in the absence
of a written agreement among the parties providing for consolidated
arbitration.62
In labor relations there can be situations where two or more employ-
ees may have conflicting interests.63 While an arbitration between the
employer and one of these employees may proceed in the absence of the
other employee who may be adversely affected by the outcome, the arbi-
tration award in the first proceeding may not bring about a final resolu-
tion of the conflict as the second employee may also compel a separate
arbitration.64
61. Id.
62. Government of U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68,74 (2d Cir. 1993) (ruling that "district
court cannot consolidate arbitration proceedings arising from separate agreements to arbi-
trate, absent the parties' agreement to allow such consolidation"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 870
(1993); Local 1351, Int'l Longshoremens Ass'n v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 214 F.3d 566, 572 (5th
Cir. 2000) (holding that principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata barred district court
from ordering office workers' union to join in tripartite arbitration with employer and long-
shoremen's union, where another district court had already entered final judgment affirming
arbitrator's decision in grievance filed by office workers' union), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1076
(2001); American Centennial Ins. Co. v. National Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991)
(stating that a "court is not permitted to interfere with private arbitration [agreements] in
order to impose its own view of speed and economy, . . . even where the result would be the
... inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings"); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln
Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("Parties may negotiate
for and include provisions for consolidation of arbitration proceedings in their arbitration
agreements, but if such provisions are absent, federal courts may not read them in.").
63. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 349 (Marlin M. Volz
& Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).
64. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 274 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that in a jurisdictional dispute, arbitration award between first union and employer
would not be completely final and binding on second union that did not participate in first
arbitration). See, e.g., Graphics Arts Int'l Union, Local 97-B v. Haddon Craftsmen, Inc., 489
F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (stating that in a seniority dispute resulting in two arbitra-
tion awards, court was "not free to vacate one award and uphold the other [when] both [drew]
their essence from the collective bargaining agreement"); In re Iroquois Beverage Corp., 27
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 906, 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1955) (because of interrelationships between
employees with respect to seniority rights, court permitted intervention by employees in an
arbitration involving seniority rights of other employees in the same seniority unit, noting that
"for every person whose seniority is advanced, someone will be adversely affected by such
advancement").
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The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the problem of inconsistent labor
arbitration awards, stating "[s]imilarly, an employee who has been dis-
charged from his position may arbitrate a grievance with his employer,
without naming as an additional party his replacement, who might have
to be discharged or demoted to reinstate a grievant who prevails in the
arbitration."65
The Seventh Circuit did not address what would happen where a sec-
ond person had a right to submit the adverse action against him or her to
arbitration. The Seventh Circuit held that, under Rule 48 of the AAA's
Commercial Rules,66 Arbitrator Campbell was without power to order
USA Wrestling to nominate anyone other than the winner of the
rematch.
Probably one of the more common situations with the potential for
conflicting arbitration awards involves jurisdiction or assignment of work
disputes where two labor unions are involved.67 The Supreme Court
recognized the place of tripartite arbitration in these disputes, stating:
In order to interpret [a collective-bargaining] agreement it is nec-
essary to consider the scope of other related collective bargaining
agreements, as well as the practice, usage and custom pertaining
to such agreements. This is particularly true when the agreement
is resorted to for the purpose of settling a jurisdictional dispute
over work assignments.68
The courts have disagreed on how to deal with tripartite jurisdic-
tional disputes. For example, the Ninth Circuit has upheld the integrity
of conflicting work assignment arbitration awards and required an em-
ployer to submit double payment for work.6 9 In Retail, Wholesale and
65. Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1039.
66. Rule R-48 provides that an "arbitrator is not empowered to redetermine the merits of
any claim already decided." AMERICAN ARBrrRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL DisPUTE REso-
LUIION PROCEDURES: COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION RULES, R-48, available at http://
www.adr.org.
67. See generally W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. 757; Sherrard L. Hayes, Jr., Comment, The
Federal Circuits' Response to Conflicting Arbitration Awards in Labor Disputes: Split or Har-
mony Between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits?, 59 TENN. L. REv. 353 (1992); Edgar A. Jones, Jr.,
A Sequel in the Evolution of the Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Labor Disputes-The
Supreme Court's Gift to Embattled Employers, 15 UCLA L. REv. 877 (1968).
68. Transportation-Communication Employees Union, 385 U.S. at 161.
69. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 600 F.2d 219, 222 (9th
Cir. 1979). See also Local 1351 Intl Longshoremen's Ass'n, 214 F.3d at 572. Cf United States
Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 893 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that parties must seek three-way arbitration before any bipartite arbitration proceedings be-
come final), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 (1990).
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Department Store Union, Local 390 v. Kroger Co.,7" the Sixth Circuit
declined to enforce a pair of conflicting arbitration awards and ordered a
new arbitration involving the employer and the two disputing unions.71
Among the factors considered in determining whether tripartite arbitra-
tion should be ordered are
(i) the breadth of the relevant arbitration provisions; (ii) the exis-
tence (or likelihood) of conflicting arbitration awards; (iii) the
compatibility of the arbitration procedures in the two [contracts];
(iv) the retrospective or prospective nature of the awards; and (v)
whether [a party] should have known of the potential conflict in
its incipiency and should have acted to prevent it.72
While tripartite arbitration may be favored in work assignment labor
disputes, a court may refuse to order tripartite arbitration where a final
judgment has already been entered affirming an arbitrator's decision in a
bilateral arbitration.73 Although a court might later modify an enforce-
ment order of an arbitration award, this does not diminish the order's
finality or present effect. 4
While courts and arbitrators are in disagreement as to whether an
arbitrator may invite the second party to participate in an arbitration
proceeding in the absence of compelling authority such as a statute or
contract language,75 the USOC's constitution expressly provides that the
parties to the arbitration must submit lists of all persons that may be
adversely affected by the arbitration and the arbitrator has the power to
determine which additional persons must receive notice of the arbitra-
70. 927 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1991). See also United States Postal Serv. v. National Rural
Letter Carriers' Ass'n, 959 F.2d 283, 286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. American Recording & Broadcasting Ass'n, 414 F.2d 1326, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1969); Local
#850, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 705 F.2d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 1983). But
see Emery Air Freight Corp. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 295, 161 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3068, 3073-74 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the "district court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing [employer's] request for an order requiring three-way arbitration" in jurisdictional
work dispute with two unions where "two collective bargaining agreements used incompatible
arbitration procedures .... neither union ha[d] agreed to follow the procedure in the other
union's agreement, .. . no 'immediate intervention [was] necessary to keep the peace' because
both [agreements had] no-strike provisions," an award in the pending bipartite arbitration
might not conflict with obligations resulting from prior arbitration, and the international union
had "an internal arbitration process for settling jurisdictional disputes between its locals").
71. 927 F.2d at 280.
72. Emery Air Freight Corp., 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3073 (citations omitted).
73. Local 1351 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 214 F.3d at 573.
74. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 193 F.3d 328,
331 (5th Cir. 1999).
75. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 63, at 350.
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tion.76 Despite this provision, for some unexplained reason, under Arti-
cle IX the "competing athlete who does not initiate the arbitration
[customarily] is not a participant and is not considered a necessary party
by the USOC. ' 77
The Seventh Circuit's view that USA Wrestling vigorously defended
its decision does not change the fact that Sieracki, a person who may
have been (and was) adversely affected by the arbitration decision, was
excluded from those arbitration proceedings.78 Although it may be nor-
mal not to include all potentially adversely affected parties in an arbitra-
tion,79 those awards are not binding with respect to such excluded
parties.80
D. CONCLUSION
Sieracki was deprived of the rewards of his victory in the June 24,
2000 wrestling match by the Lindland I arbitration proceeding. As Sier-
acki was neither notified of, nor made a party to that arbitration pro-
ceeding, he was not bound by the arbitrator's decision in that case. On
the other hand, USA Wrestling participated in the Lindland I arbitration
proceeding and it was bound by the outcome in that proceeding.8'
The problem presented by two inconsistent arbitration awards in
Lindland II might have been avoided had the arbitrator in Lindland I
notified Sieracki of the arbitration and permitted him to participate as
permitted by Article IX of the USOC constitution. Not only would such
an action have eliminated the possibility of inconsistent awards, but such
action would have given Sieracki the opportunity to participate in a
hearing that was going to decide whether he was going to the Olympic
games. Basic concepts of fair play and due process demand nothing less.
Should the arbitrator decide, as the arbitrator did in Lindland I, not
to give the other athlete notice of the arbitration proceeding, when the
76. USOC CONSTITUTION, supra note 50, art. IX, § 3. The AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules are silent with respect to the right of a person who may be adversely affected by an
arbitration proceeding to intervene in that proceeding.
77. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Arbitrator Campbell).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Consolidated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 213 F.3d 404,408-09 (7th
Cir. 2000) (res judicata effect of judicial decision merely confirming an arbitral award is ex-
tremely limited. "All it amounts to is a determination that there is no basis for upending that
award."); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 370 F.2d 833,833-36
(10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967) (prior arbitration award does not have res
judicata effect). Cf. Grenig, supra note 57, at § 9.06[1][c].
81. Lindland, 230 F.3d at 1040.
2001]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
prevailing party seeks confirmation of the award the district could com-
pel joinder of the other athlete under Rule 19.82 By joining the absent
athlete, the court will be able to determine whether the athlete was
prejudiced by not having been given notice of the arbitration proceed-
ing. Additionally, the absent athlete will have the opportunity to present
argument as to whether the award should or should not be confirmed.
While in many cases, the National Governing Body may argue vigor-
ously on behalf of the athlete who prevailed in the athletic competition,
this may not always be the case. There may be situations where the Na-
tional Governing Body has no strong interest in defending the athlete
who prevailed in the competition or may actually favor the athlete chal-
lenging the result. By giving the both athletes the opportunity to partici-
pate in the arbitration hearing or, at the very least, in the hearing to
confirm the arbitration award, fair play and due process will be the
winners.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. See also Local 1351, Int'l Longshoremens Ass'n, 214 F.3d at 568
(second union that had not participated in arbitration between employer and first union
joined by district court as indispensable party during proceedings to confirm award).
[Vol. 12:261
